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Abstract 
This article deconstructs the events surrounding the initial deletion of Richard 
Drew’s “Falling Man” photograph from the archive of September 11. Via such phi-
losophers as Paul Ricoeur and Georges Didi-Huberman, it explores the ethical 
implications of examining the photograph, both by itself and in montage, and in-
vestigates American views of death and dying in that context. The testimonies and 
images that followed the collapse of the World Trade Center brought to the fore 
several prescient, though often ignored, philosophical questions which surround 
the nature of the image, its role in shaping the narrative of an event, and whether an 
image of a man in the last seconds of his life, directly following his decision to die 
but preceding his death, functions as a reminder that we might carefully interrogate 
what it means to deem something unimaginable, unfathomable, unrepresentable.
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Introduction 
Given the nature of twenty-four hour news channels, the internet, newspapers, mag-
azines, and written narratives, we all became witnesses to an event that many deemed 
too horrific for certain types of representation, despite the fact that we, collectively 
and as a society, watched it happen. On September 11, 2001, even far away from the 
epicenter of what reporters began calling “an attack on America,” we, the media-con-
suming public, were overtaken by an almost immediate desire for details.  The media, 
in an attempt to make sense of the event, presented viewers with a seemingly endless 
barrage of images, sound clips, and photographs to show us what happened, and our 
focusing question quickly shifted: who was responsible, and why? When the towers 
collapsed, this became even more relevant. Everything stopped. Air travel halted, 
schools closed. Temporality lost its linear shape as we watched the endless loop of 
airplanes crashing and buildings collapsing. Even when the shock passed, we de-
manded answers to the “who?” and the “why?” Given the attachment to media cov-
erage of the event, the television-watching public became obsessed with retribution. 
 
Americans do not want to discuss death as a fundamental aspect of life, particularly 
when scores of us die within minutes or hours of one another on American soil. 
On September 11, questions surrounding death and dying became unpleasantly 
present in the collective American consciousness. A seemingly endless narrative 
about what happens when we die, particularly when traditional funerary rituals 
cannot take place due to the mutilation or disappearance of bodies, confronted, 
confused, and repelled us. Journalists, photographers, and eyewitnesses went to 
great lengths to preserve what they saw and heard that morning, largely due to the 
American public’s demand for up-to-the-minute archiving, and the public respond-
ed with consternation: the direct attack on our fear of mortality, the destruction 
of the World Trade Center, and the testimonies and images that followed, brought 
to the fore several prescient, though often ignored, philosophical questions that 
I will investigate here. These questions surround the nature of the image, its role 
in shaping the narrative of an event, and whether an image of a man in the last 
seconds of his life, directly following his decision to die but preceding his death, 
functions as a reminder that we might carefully interrogate what it means to deem 
something unimaginable, unfathomable, unrepresentable.  Even within the media 
circus that 9/11 became, one kind of image quickly became taboo: though we de-
manded photographic evidence of what occurred and planted ourselves in front of 
our televisions to watch the loop of footage that is now emblazoned in our brains, 
we were offended--even viscerally repulsed--when the media fed us photographs 
and video of people jumping from the towers in the moments before their collapse.
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Part 1: The Photograph  
The photograph first appeared in newspapers on September 12, 2001. It was dif-
ferent, somehow, from other depictions of the event: the subject is a single human, 
clad in black and white, seemingly suspended in midair against a metallic gray, 
black, and white series of vertical lines. The male figure occupies only the upper 
third of the frame and is perfectly aligned with the background. Spanning across 
the horizontal axis of the image, from upper-left to lower-right, is a series of four 
lines in the background, on a downward diagonal, that appear to be a reflection. 
The angle of the figure’s left leg runs parallel to these lines, forcing the eye across, 
down, and back to the human shape. The organic shape of the human figure exists 
in stark contrast to the geometric shapes behind him, and the hard lines set him 
apart. Running vertically along the left side of the frame are black stripes; on the 
right, the stripes are gray, and a fine mist hovers in the middleground. The clear-
est part of the man is the silhouette of his black shoe, which stands out from the 
stark white-and-gray background. His hands are behind his back and appear to 
be folded. The only part of the frame that is a color other than black, white, gray, 
or silver is the man’s face, which is a shade of light brown, and what appears to 
be an orange undershirt under his white coat. He could be floating, hanging. He 
could be attached to an invisible cable. He could be superimposed onto the back-
ground, which, though we know is the World Trade Center, could be any office 
building, a striped set, or a reflection. The photograph could be a piece of art.
Without context, the image is almost soothing. It is, aesthetically speaking, beau-
tiful.  There are no signs of airplanes, of burning buildings, or of the tumult on 
the streets of New York. Indeed, the image is still and quiet in a way that para-
doxically underscores the enormity of the event: here is a man jumping from a 
height of 106 stories (approximately 1300 feet), reaching a speed of 150 miles an 
hour before hitting the ground some ten seconds after the jump. This is not what 
the photograph depicts. Though it implies movement, both of the figure and of 
the viewer’s eye, it is almost static in its quietude, and from some distance the eye 
might not even register that the figure is human. Richard Drew’s photograph tells 
only one part of the story behind the most televised event in history, the event 
that produced the shock and awe which foreshadowed the Bush administration’s 
later bombing campaign in Iraq and which led to scores of art exhibits, books, 
websites, academic journals and anthologies, and a host of conspiracy theories.
Drew’s image was met with controversy from the beginning. Newspaper editors 
describe the horror with which they met the photograph; the editor of the Allen-
town, Pennsylvania Morning Call, a traditional medium-sized newspaper, recounts 
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a long meeting with his editorial staff, during which some members got up and 
left, too sickened by the image to even consider publishing it (Singer). Hundreds of 
newspapers ran it anyway, and the public’s response was swift, effective, and indica-
tive of the American desire--even need--to dismiss the photograph from collective 
memory. Journalist Tom Junod describes one potential reason for this: “[T]he sight 
of the jumpers provided the corrective to those who insisted on saying what they 
were witnessing was ‘like a movie,’ for this was an ending as unimaginable as it 
was unbearable” (1).We had to avert our gaze; we never adjusted to Falling Man in 
quite the same way that we accepted the footage of the airplanes hitting the towers. 
Drew’s photograph disappeared from view almost as quickly as it arrived, follow-
ing a vehement public outcry against it. Direct testimony about the violent feelings 
that Falling Man evoked falls onto a continuum of interrogatory outrage: one wit-
ness’ subjective “I couldn’t process the information” follows others’ empathetic “[it 
was] an impossible decision” and attempts to understand “the absolute horror of 
making that choice.” All of these were eclipsed by a more common judgment, one 
that reflects the visceral feelings that the photograph produced: “I felt like I was 
punched in the stomach [when I saw the photograph]. It feels obscene” (all qtd. in 
Singer). People wrote letters and made phone calls in protest of the picture, claiming 
(in ways that echo arguments against photographs from Auschwitz) that looking 
at it and other images of the jumpers was ethically wrong and morally corrupt. 
The media’s subsequent treatment of these photographic representations, as Marc 
Redfield explains in “Virtual Trauma: the Idiom of 9/11,” illustrates the power of 
the jumpers on the American psyche: “[They became] a locus of fascination and 
of moralizing language about the importance of bearing witness. . . .Where there 
is censorship there is desire. The jumpers were at the epicenter of a wider econo-
my of ambivalence, within which frenzied representational activity coexisted with 
official and unofficial acts of negation” (70, emphasis mine).This unearths a para-
dox: the public, craving all of the information the media could provide, demanded 
images like “Falling Man,” but were simultaneously so deeply disturbed that they 
deemed such images unfit for public consumption. What the images depicted was 
unrepresentable. And significantly, though American demand has provoked the 
media to evolve into a culture of frenzied representation, the kind of intimacy pres-
ent in a photograph like Falling Man arouses outrage. We want to see only what 
we can immediately understand, not something that forces us into an extended 
ethical and aesthetical deliberation about viewing the final seconds of a man’s life.
Junod’s September, 2003 Esquire story about the falling man became another part of 
the 9/11 archive, largely because of its stunning characterization of media-addicted, 
yet moralistic, viewers: Junod describes “a nation of voyeurs” who harbor “a desire 
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to face the most disturbing aspects of our most disturbing day,” but simultaneously 
demand the deletion of the photograph from the archive.  Other critics have called 
viewing the photograph an act of “voyeurism, as though the jumpers’ experience, 
instead of being central to the horror, was tangential to it, a slideshow best forgot-
ten” (3).In this way, the photograph represents the intricate relationship between 
viewers and the media: our collective conscious demands photographic evidence, 
but only if it doesn’t disturb us too much. We asked and newspapers responded 
by printing the photograph, after which the editors were met with a critique harsh 
enough to provoke self-censorship--nearly every image of the jumpers disappeared, 
and were swiftly substituted with images of firefighters and police, heroically brav-
ing the dust and flame to save survivors. The media replaced the jumpers with the 
heroes, seemingly because many Americans wanted to see themselves differently: 
we/they craved a reflection of American fortitude and strength, not one of terror 
and of having to act in an unrepresentable way, seemingly based upon pure instinct. 
Richard Drew responded to attacks against him--”you can’t photograph this!”--and 
the ensuing hysteria by writing a brief article for the Los Angeles Times, in which 
he connects this saga to Americans’ fear of confronting mortality: “What unsettles 
people about the picture [is that] we look at it and we put ourselves in the jumper’s 
place. And we ask, ‘Which option would I choose? Would I wait and pray for help as 
the flames licked at me, or jump through fresh air and sunlight, to certain death?” 
(3). Drew goes on to describe the manner in which editors explained their self-cen-
sorship to him, recounting a conversation in which an editor said “Americans don’t 
want to look at pictures of death and dying over their morning cornflakes” (qtd. 
in Drew 2). Drew responds to this by making a direct connection to the other: “I 
think they’re fine with it, as long as the victims aren’t American” (2). I take this one 
step further: they’re fine with it as long as the victims aren’t American and aren’t 
committing a culturally taboo act that, in all of its horror, forces Americans to con-
template whether or not they would do the same thing given the same circumstanc-
es. In Drew’s words, “he is you and me” (3).  This reveals another paradox: if “he 
is you and me,” alterity forecloses the possibility of empathy. In this case, it might 
be that we have absorbed the falling man and assumed his burden for ourselves. 
Part 2: Representing the Unrepresentable and the Question of Interpretation 
          
All of this raises significant ethical questions about the nature of photography that 
one might compare to the discourse that Georges Didi-Huberman unravels in his 
2008 Images in Spite of All: Four Photographs from Auschwitz and that simulta-
neously echo Paul Ricoeur’s historiographical process as outlined in Memory, His-
tory, Forgetting.  In the latter, Ricoeur explores the essence of the unrepresentable, 
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describing it as “something in the event itself so monstrous as to put to flight all 
the modes available to representation” (256). His investigation of “the principle of 
a distinction between interpretation and fact,” and assertion that the distinction 
itself is “undetermined, and the boundary between ‘true’ and ‘false,’ ‘imaginary’ and 
‘factual,’ ‘figurative’ and ‘literal’ story falls” illuminates the ethical questions sur-
rounding Falling Man: the fact is that people jumped from the towers in a final act 
of desperation, and that many others would likely do the same thing, despite their 
unwillingness to contemplate the act (256). Interpretations, however, are more com-
plicated; in this case, they range from outright denial (“they didn’t really jump” or 
“they were blown out of the building in an explosion”) to the focus on heroism that 
the media offered as a replacement for the troublesome images. In the case of “Fall-
ing Man,” the media replaced the facts of the event with the figurative “American 
hero” as a way to mend our fractured collective psychology and to craft an archive 
with which we are more comfortable.   Ricoeur’s assertion that “it is an illusion to 
believe that factual statements can satisfy the idea of the unrepresentable, as though 
facts could through the virtue of their literal presentation be dissociated from their 
representation in the form of events in a history” is, therefore, accurate. The public 
could not accept any interpretation of a fact that they could also not accept (257). 
Though the jumpers were American citizens, they became the other, albeit a para-
doxical other, following their tragic final action. Facts and interpretation are inti-
mately linked in the formation of any archive, and any attempt to alter the archive 
by eliminating photographs like Falling Man and replace them with heroic imag-
es illustrates the significance of interpretation within the scope of historiography.
Aesthetics and ethics, then, become nearly inseparable. When we are confront-
ed with a disturbing image, particularly when taken out of context, we may make 
an initial aesthetical judgment (Falling Man is a beautiful image), but that judg-
ment is quickly replaced with the question of whether or not we should look at 
the photograph--an ethical judgment. The relationship to the photographic ob-
ject becomes a juxtaposition between an event and a way of classifying and un-
derstanding that event. Didi-Huberman’s insistence that the archive can--and 
does--reveal significant ideologies behind the marriage of aesthetics and ethics 
corresponds to Ricoeur’s assertion that, to reach the possibility of total reflection 
and absolute knowledge, one must imagine--and even retrace--historical time. In 
this case, one might argue that replaying the footage of the airplanes hitting the 
World Trade Center retraces one aspect of historical time; I would add that, in or-
der to reflect on the event in an ethical manner, we must include images of the 
jumpers, despite their disturbing nature. We must see the images in order to im-
agine the horror of 9/11 which, in turn, “contradict[s] the dogma of the unim-
aginable” (Didi-Huberman 64), thereby revealing significant aspects of an event 
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that we would rather forget. Didi-Huberman explains this: “When images dis-
appear, words and feelings also disappear. So, too, does transmission itself ” (84).
Two of Didi-Huberman’s harshest critics, Gérard Wajcman and Elizabeth Pagnoux, 
argue that looking at photographs of this kind is fundamentally problematic, given 
their status as what Wajcman classifies as “beyond imagination” (qtd. in Didi-Hu-
berman 27). For Wajcman, the photographs from Auschwitz are an attempt to rep-
resent the unimaginable in a way that runs the “risk of overinterpretation,” resulting 
in “reassuring falsehood” that poses significant ethical and political dangers by “as-
similating everything” (51-53). Pagnoux’s arguments against interpreting the pho-
tographs stems from her fear of turning an analysis into a “reconstitution, fiction, 
creation . . . [a] relentless determination to destroy the gaze” (54).The problem that 
Wajcman and Pagnoux have with the four photographs from Auschwitz is indeed 
one of interpretation and not of fact, which echoes the primary criticism of Falling 
Man. You can’t take photographs of that because capturing the image of a man in his 
final moments of life is, in Wajcman’s words, “unimaginable.” You shouldn’t inter-
pret this photograph of the jumper because any interpretation, in Pagnoux’s words, 
will “nullify memory” (54). It is as if interpretation were outright impossible. In-
deed, “unimaginable” is also a word that surfaced in response to Drew’s photograph.
Didi-Huberman’s reply to Wajcman and Pagnoux, that “’unimaginable’ is a tragic 
word,” and that failing to include the photographs in a montage “dissociates history 
from concept” (101, 103, original emphasis) becomes relevant to this investigation 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, there exists a significant question about the American 
media’s replacement of images of the jumpers with images of heroes, seemingly in an 
attempt to sanitize the event and make it less disturbing (if such a thing is possible).
Secondly, the Falling Man narrative illuminates Didi-Huberman’s insistence that by 
asking too much or too little of an image, we develop a “fragmentary . . . relation to 
the truth to which they bear witness” that leads to inadequacy, in the case of asking 
too much, or a removal from “their phenomonology, from their specificity, and from 
their very substance,” in the case of asking too little (32-33).The solution, then, might 
be to consider the photograph not as the all-image of 9/11, but as one aspect of a hor-
rific event. By including Falling Man and images like it in a photographic montage 
of that day, the archive can go beyond “the pure and simple ‘reflection’ of the event . 
. . [or] pure and simple ‘evidence’” as a way to “reintroduce the historical singulari-
ties into the theoretical thinking of the phenomenon” (101, 103, original emphasis).
 
Even in an age when, as Didi-Huberman phrases it, the terrible has become a com-
modity, the images force us to remember--lest we forget, and thereby, following 
Ricoeur, forgive--the event in all of its parts, including the distressing reality of the 
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jumpers. Far from functioning to reinforce the fetishistic voyeurism that Wajcman 
and Pagnoux fear, allowing the photograph into the montage reflects Didi-Huber-
man’s argument that forming a connection between image and truth is just as im-
portant as the one between seeing and knowing. In other words, images unearth as-
pects of the factual truth that might lead to the ability to interpret them in a way that 
functions to foster a better understanding of history. The fundamental problem at 
the root of this controversy is that looking at Falling Man in montage is not easy. In 
fact, when put into context, alongside photographs of firefighters, burning buildings, 
explosions, and the faces of human horror on the street, it becomes an example of an 
image functioning “to show what we cannot see,” to “visually transcend the trivial 
contrasts between the visible and the invisible” (133, original emphasis)--it becomes 
an abjection. We cannot “see death,” nor can we see how someone might make the 
choice to jump from the World Trade Center. We cannot “see what the witnesses 
experienced,” but including the forbidden image in the archive “gives the visual ex-
perience a power that our visible certainties or habits have the effect of pacifying, or 
veiling” (136, original emphasis).We must look in order to understand. Didi-Huber-
man’s contention that photographic testimonies form a vital part of the archive that 
historians have an ethical obligation to include, if taken as logically sound, foreclos-
es the possibility of continuing to eliminate Falling Man from the archive of 9/11.
For Didi-Huberman, calling a horrific event “unimaginable” and insisting that dis-
turbing images fetishize the event become a form of unforgivable dishonesty. In-
deed, one might take this to its logical extreme and decide that not considering 
the images is far worse than including them in the archive. Didi-Huberman’s use 
of a Ricoeurean tactic--recognizing that it is an impossible task to think about the 
world without the microhistories that such photographs illustrate--effectively de-
constructs Wajcman’s argument that looking is fundamentally unjust, Pagnoux’s 
contention that looking encourages us to fetishize the image, and by extension, the 
declaration presented by critics of Falling Man that we should not allow ourselves 
to see this aspect of the event. There are no facts in the archive; it is all interpreta-
tion. Even if the photographs elicit “real horror[, which is] a source of impotence 
for us,” including them can be a source of action, not impotence. By confronting 
horrific images that disturb us to the core, we may employ our judgment to “sit-
uate the ethical question itself. . . . Is it as a fellow human [en tant que sembla-
ble] that one human being becomes the executioner of another [?]” (154, original 
emphasis). Is it as fellow humans that we might stop to ponder the horrible deci-
sion to jump or not, thus forcing us to contemplate the question of mortality that 
we so wish to avoid? Is it as fellow humans that we might allow Falling Man into 
the archive, in order to recognize our alterity and uncover the truth of the event? 
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If the photographs, a form of witness testimony, are “a possible point of contact . 
. . between the image and the real “ (75, original emphasis), this underscores his 
later point that they are “neither nothing nor all” (111).Indeed, no narrative is nei-
ther nothing nor all. Every narrative is a point of contact, and our human desire 
to seek cohesive narratives that represent universal ideas may enable us to form a 
version of the truth that branches beyond mere intersubjectivity and into a realm 
where, by taking a dialectical approach, we begin to imagine visually and linguis-
tically. We need the images (or photographic testimony) alongside the written 
and oral testimonies in order to responsibly build an archive. The philosophical 
question thus changes: what do we protect when, like Wajcman, we question the 
validity of an image, or of any testimony? Is calling something “unimaginable” a 
mere “simple refusal to think the image,” or is it symptomatic of a more sinister 
underlying ideology (158)? My response is, on the surface, simple: in order to be 
ethical, we have to look at the images in order to establish connections between 
aesthetics, ethics, and history. The imagination itself can be an ethical and political 
faculty: when we view Falling Man, we recognize a human being who is similar to 
us, which reinscribes the horror that the event produced. Contemplating having 
to make that choice is difficult but necessary. Far from “unimaginable,” the image 
reminds us that, in Didi-Huberman’s words, “in the fact of every image we have to 
choose whether, or how, to make it participate in our knowledge and action” (180).
Ricoeur’s definition of history as the transference of memory to a narrative of the 
“presence of absence or absence of a previous presence” (Ricoeur 22) connects to 
Didi-Huberman’s insistence that we should use the images--even if they are neither 
nothing nor all--to ask questions. Ricoeur asserts that historical writing functions 
to represent the past, thereby creating a historical text that represents the events 
stored in our archives, and which have been questioned in terms of “why?” and 
“because.” This reflects the debate between Wajcman and Didi-Huberman: “why 
these images, when they’re not the all-image?” might be answered, in this case, with 
a simple “any act of the image is snatched from the impossible description of a re-
ality” (Didi-Huberman 125).In this respect, the question here is not as transparent 
as a Ricoeurean witness saying “I was there. If you don’t believe me, ask someone 
else,” because of the public outcry against the photographs. It becomes more about 
compiling witness testimony alongside images like these. If we read the photo-
graphs as narrative, and then read the narrative surrounding the photographs, we 
uncover a hidden ideology that we, with Didi-Huberman, might wish to question. 
The question becomes one of ethical-responsibility-through-interpretation, and 
whether we are willing to aesthetically and ethically interpret such disturbing im-
ages.Indeed, they are not “unimaginable.” On the contrary. Falling Man and images 
like it contain the traces of the past from which we may build archives and history.
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Part 3: Grief, Derrida’s Impossible Possibility, and the “Not Yet” of Death 
          
One aspect of this photograph that is difficult to ignore is the fact that it does not 
depict a dead man. It shows the act of death, the final moments of a man’s life. Due 
to his infinite suspension in midair, the man illustrates aspects of what Derrida, in 
his 2002 Acts of Religion, calls “hostipitality,” or an act of mourning that doubles as 
hospitality, and what Judith Butler characterizes as “grievability,” or a way of mark-
ing lives that can be lost, lives that matter. Derrida’s description of hospitality as a 
temporal category, or of “the question of waiting, of the time of waiting and of wait-
ing beyond time” (Derrida 359) works to illuminate his earlier ruminations about 
the “not yet” of death in ways that directly apply to an image of a man who has not 
yet died.  The photograph intrudes upon our conception of hospitality-to-the-oth-
er, since our absorption of the falling man requires an alterity that forecloses the 
possibility of empathy. And, though we cannot offer hospitality to the falling man 
or indeed to any other, it functions as a way of “welcoming the other that does not 
warn me of his coming” (381).When it does occur, it marks a paradoxical version 
of alterity: “I am like [comme] the other, there where I cannot be, and could never 
be like him, in his resemblance, his identification, or in his place” (390). Though 
we can grieve the life of the other, even that grief collapses as we absorb aspects 
of that life. This absorption makes the man constantly grievable; our identifica-
tion with the other, in this case, means that we grieve our own future deaths as we 
watch him fall. This philosophical aporia challenges Richard Drew’s contention that 
the empathetic response to the photograph might be the source of any argument 
against it: even though he is not me, he could be me and I could be him. By the 
time we view the image, the man is already dead and, despite surface differences, 
he will have died in the same way that, once we are gone, we all will have died.
 
Within American culture there exists an aversion to questioning and confronting 
mortality, particularly suicide; in fact, the subject is almost taboo, and we frequently 
relegate serious discussions of it to quiet whispers among close friends and family. 
We cannot prove that the World Trade Center jumpers made any kind of conscious 
decision to jump; in fact, the evidence indicates that, in many cases, jumping was an 
act of desperation, not premeditation.  One thing is certain, however: when we were 
confronted with the pictures of jumpers, the rhetoric that followed included the notion 
that, somehow, they were other, particularly in relation to the heroes who stepped in 
to save lives. In her 2006 Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, Butler 
makes an assertion about the nature of other-in-death that, though based in her read-
ing of Levinas, elucidates aspects of Derrida’s conception of hospitality to the other:
[M]y own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with oth-
ers. I am not fully known to myself, because part of what I am is the enigmatic traces of oth-
ers. In this sense, I cannot know myself perfectly or know my ‘difference’ from others in an ir-
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reducible way. . . .I am wounded, and I find that the wound itself testifies to the fact that I am 
impressionable, given over to the Other in ways that I cannot fully predict or control. (46)
We did not want to imagine ourselves as enigmatic traces of people who jumped out 
of buildings; we resist that kind of horrible alterity. Any kind of connection that we 
may have had to people who had to make such a terrible decision reminds us that 
we are like they were: we are human, and we may have made the same choice under 
similar circumstances.  The “testimony of the wound” that Butler describes functions 
as a reminder of this, and the fact remains that we may not have been able to predict 
or control our behavior in response to the photograph. Even though Drew may have 
made an ethical decision when he shot the frames and the editors certainly made 
one when they ran the photograph in newspapers, we could not know that part 
of ourselves because, to use Derrida’s phrasing, such knowledge is “incalculable.” 
 
For Derrida, the incalculable is anything that escapes rational structures. It is a 
moment that cannot be communicated, which leads us into an attempt to com-
municate that incommunicability. In this case, so many people were so shocked 
and offended by the image that even the possibility of expressing incommunica-
bility became impossible: it escaped our collective grasp. In Aporias, Derrida de-
mands that we accept the incalculable as a possibility, and his description of “the 
very concept of culture [as] . . . synonymous with the culture of death” highlights 
the importance of resisting the urge to bury the image (43). The media’s self-cen-
sorship thus becomes intricately woven with questions surrounding borders and 
limits. In the case of Falling Man, Derrida’s paradoxical formulation lives: Rich-
ard Drew communicated that which was incommunicable, leading to the foreclo-
sure of any possibility of an ethical or aesthetical consideration of the image.  The 
choice to jump is more incalculable than the image itself for a moralistic socie-
ty that refuses to empathize with other human beings who were confronted with 
an impossible choice. The idea of suicide, even under incalculable duress, push-
es the limits of what we choose to contemplate. Making the jumpers other illus-
trates our collective need to maintain a safe distance between ourselves and anyone 
who jumped. Though they are not me, I am like they are. I may contain a part 
of them that inextricably alters me. And this might make me uncomfortable, ir-
ritated, less likely to be hospitable. In Butler’s words, “to kill the other is to deny 
my life” (Butler xxvi).Within this image, then, alterity, hospitality, and mourning 
converge into grief for the falling man--and for ourselves. This, too, is incalculable.
 
In Aporias, Derrida, following Heidegger, divides the conception of death into three 
levels. The singular level involves a death that is always individual. No one can die 
for another person; each person must die his or her own death, and one’s death is 
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exclusively his or her own. In the case of Falling Man, many seemed content to con-
sider death from this perspective alone. The universal level, however, involves the 
securing of a priority of questioning death in an existential sense, before biology, 
theology, physics, or anthropology, and this is where we broke down in our con-
sideration of the image. The particular level encompasses questions of culture and 
history and becomes connected to the singular in this way: because our culture is 
so adverse to any such existential questions, we were satisfied to relegate the image 
to an example of the singular level, foregoing any interrogation of the culture and 
history from which the jumpers came. The “not yet” precedes the incalculable in 
this way: for Derrida, the possibility of death (“I can die”) and the impossibility of 
death (“I cannot die”) represent the possibility of death’s impossibility, and mark an 
inaccessibility of death as such. The photograph forced us to consider the possibility 
of our own deaths in similar circumstances; we only know about the possibility of 
death at all because of our experiences with others’ deaths, which reveals another 
paradox. The possibility of death exists even without an adequate system of rep-
resentation, and even when a representation, like Falling Man, is inadequate. The 
“not yet” always comes too soon or too late, and part of the problem that the public 
had with Drew’s photograph may be that it depicts the “not yet” in such stunning 
fashion. The suddenness of the appearance of the man’s image in our minds consti-
tutes a temporal moment that violates the idea of the incalculable: it makes visible 
a moment that we do not wish to see, opens wounds that we would prefer to keep 
hidden, and illustrates that the “stages of grief ” with which we are all familiar break 
down when confronted with such a haunting violation of our resistance to alterity.
Closure: An Ethical Decision 
Americans remember, vividly and often disturbingly, where we were when it hap-
pened. Over the course of this investigation, I tried to explain the nature of my research 
to various people. I was met with “I remember exactly where I was when it happened” 
followed by a narrative, some hesitant, some longer than others, of witness testimony.
“My aunt was there.”
“I was in Brooklyn and felt the ground vibrate.”
“I was on my way to work and heard it on the radio.”
“I was watching the Today show and it came on.”
“I thought it was a joke until I saw the footage.”
“It was like one of those apocalypse movies.” 
I remember where I was, too: I was on my way to work and heard it on the radio. I 
was listening to a popular morning talk show at the time, and immediately thought 
the host was making a most inappropriate joke, and I recall thinking that he had fi-
nally gone overboard. When I arrived at work, I pulled out the television, turned on 
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the one station that the antenna would receive, and became completely immersed 
in the instant replay. My first reaction, that it must be a joke, was met with the slow 
realization that it was really happening. My response was not an uncommon one.
Tom Junod writes that “[w]e have somehow taken it upon ourselves to deem [the 
jumpers’] deaths unworthy of witness--because we have somehow deemed the act of 
witness, in this one regard, unworthy of us” (Junod 5), which underscores Didi-Hu-
berman’s contention that taking photographs can be an ethical and political act. 
Didi-Huberman argues that photography is a performative act that cannot be sepa-
rated from the documentary core of an event. Though there is something in Falling 
Man that we might wish to call “unrepresentable”; that is, the decision to jump, the 
desperate act of jumping, what it must feel like to free-fall for over 1300 feet, and the 
inevitable landing, the empathy that it could evoke in viewers, were it not for alterity, 
should not be overlooked. Indeed, the empathy/alterity division might be the prob-
lem; forcing people to ask themselves what they would do in such a situation makes 
the event present in a way that other kinds of images cannot. At the time, this was 
unfathomable--and in fact, the American media decided to replace the “disturbing” 
images of the jumpers with heroic pictures of firefighters and police officers, risking 
their lives to save survivors in the midst of chaos. The jumpers became the other: 
they were not me and not heroic, in spite of the fact that they became a part of me 
and of my recollection of the event. Collective consciousness demanded that we 
make some images taboo in order to encourage the “correct” ethical judgment--that 
9/11 was too horrible for words or certain kinds of images--thereby eliminating any 
possibility of an objective ethical judgment about jumping, about photographing 
the jumpers, and about the need to include the photograph in the montage of 9/11.
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1 My definition of “we,” for purposes of this argument, is limited to those like myself, who, in the 
days immediately following the events of 9/11, were riveted by the media coverage of the event. 
Since so many members of the American--and, indeed, global--public relied on the media for up-
to-the-minute coverage of the attack’s aftermath, I have adopted the pronoun “we” to signify those 
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of us who maintained an eye on the mediascape following the tragedy. Politically speaking, the 
media in fact created the kind of climate that allowed for the deletion of Falling Man; though the 
image was not reproduced frequently following its initial run in several hundred newspapers, it is 
clear that few have forgotten it.
 2 The intrusion upon the linearity of temporality reflects Lyotard’s idea, outlined in The Inhuman, 
of negative presentation; that is, the media footage of the event may have indicated the fact that, 
in fact, the event could not be presented. Though we attempted to grasp the largeness of 9/11, we 
could not. Indeed, for Lyotard, any assertion of the unrepresentable becomes a temporal category.
 3 Even within the large body of peer-reviewed academic work on 9/11 that exists, Falling Man 
is conspicuously under-represented. For an extended reflection on digital photography merging 
with events themselves and photography following 9/11, see Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s 2003 
“Kodak Moments, Flashbulb Memories: Reflections on 9/11.”Many of the academic explorations of 
9/11 have been, as one might imagine, deeply political: see Andreas Huyssen’s 2002 “Twin Memo-
ries: Afterimages of Nine/Eleven” for a compelling exploration of the political meanings behind the 
commemorations, Robert Doran’s 2008 “Terrorism and Cultural Theory: The Singularity of 9/11” 
for an analysis of the need for a holistic interpretation of the event and direct connections between 
the attacks and American aversion to Islam, or Gayatri Chakravoty Spivak’s 2004 “Terror: A Speech 
after 9-11,” which focuses on Kant’s “enlightened scholar” and potential humanities-based ap-
proaches to the event.
 Rob Kroes (2009) treats Falling Man among other images. He focuses on the connection 
between Drew’s photograph and Don DeLillo’s 2007 novel of the same name, and asserts that “there 
may come a time when Drew’s picture will be seen and remembered in its full iconic power, finding 
its place in the continued quest for the meaning of 9/11” (p. 77).
 4 In Critique of Judgement, Immanuel Kant (1793/2007) describes the faculty of thinking the 
particular as contained under the universal and the disinterested pleasure that precedes any judg-
ment of the beautiful (§1-5). He goes on to describe claims to universality that such judgments 
assume (§6-9).This becomes relevant to this argument because aesthetic judgments can be neither 
cognitive nor based in use value; judging the photograph to be aesthetically beautiful is therefore 
impossible when it is taken within its context; however, it may be judged as beautiful when it stands 
alone.
 5 Julia Kristeva (1982) might label this an instance of collective abjection. Because the man will 
ultimately die, we might consider Kristeva’s characterization of the corpse: “[It] is the utmost of ab-
jection. It is death infecting life. It is something rejected from which one does not part, from which 
one does not protect oneself as from an object. . . . It beckons to us and ends up engulfing us” (p. 
4).See Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection.
 6 Junod’s article identifies the source of the media’s self-imposed censorship of the image as being 
connected to “the story behind [the photograph] . . . and the search for the man pictured in it [as] 
our most intimate connection to the horror of that day” (p. 1). Following the reception of the pho-
tograph, Junod became admittedly obsessed with finding the man whom Drew had captured on 
film, as if identifying the unrepresentable with a name, an occupation, and a life story would soothe 
the apoplectic American psyche.
 7 For a compelling analysis of the kinds of empathy evoked by Falling Man and other pictures 
of the jumpers, see Nicolaus Mills (2009). Mills posits that “the key to the newspapers’ pictorial 
coverage of 9/11 was the ability of their photographers to capture scenes of individual suffering and 
heroism that allowed the big picture to become an intimate one” (p. 76), and goes on to explore the 
debate about how to classify the people who jumped; the New York coroner’s office refused to rule 
their deaths suicide. Mills also explores some possibilities about what it means to replace horrifying 
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photographs with more straightforward “stor[ies] behind . . . flag-raising” (p. 79). 
Redfield (2007) makes a connection to Judith Butler’s statements about intersubjectivity, writing 
that if we affirm that part of our own individual identities stem from the “enigmatic traces of oth-
ers,” it makes absolute sense that we do not want to look at the pictures, since we’re confronted with 
a trace of someone who made a decision that we might make (p. 62).
 8 I am not comparing the events of 9/11 with the events of the Shoah, but merely using Didi-Hu-
berman’s text as a way of investigating the debates between aesthetics and ethics that occurred in 
both situations.
 9 One photograph that grew to represent 9/11 is Thomas Franklin’s Three Firefighters, which de-
picts three New York firefighters raising an American flag, which they had captured from a yacht, 
in the ash and rubble of the World Trade Center. The photograph immediately appeared almost 
everywhere, including on the front pages of newspapers and the cover of Time magazine, and 
Franklin became a celebrity and a Pulitzer Prize finalist. The iconic image came to signify Ameri-
can strength and fortitude in the wake of tragedy: Newsweek ran it on its cover with the title “God 
Bless America” in its special report on 9/11 and returned to the firefighters a year later in another 
special issue. In 2002, the photograph became a United States postage stamp with the title “Heroes 
USA.” 
 10 There exist several pieces by Derrida on the nature of hospitality. Here, I am making reference 
to “Hostipitality,” a chapter in his 2002 Acts of Religion.
 11 Junod, in his exploration of the identity of the man, uncovers some jumpers’ underlying health 
problems (like asthma) that may have provoked them to seek fresh air and caused them to jump or 
to fall.
 12 This is also reminiscent of Derrida’s future anterior construction. In the case of “Falling Man,” 
the future anterior reveals its significance: from here, we have to say “he will have died,” not “he is 
dead” or “he is dying.” We want to put the image, and possibly the signified itself, under erasure in 
order to avoid this unimaginable construction. 
 13 Indeed, part of the ongoing debate about the jumpers has been completely (and paradoxically) 
ethical: under what conditions is suicide acceptable? In a largely Judeo-Christian American society, 
it is unacceptable to many in most cases, even when one is faced with the alternative of burning to 
death.
 14 In The Future of the Image, Jacques Rancière (2007) explores the unrepresentable as being 
“[that] which is the central category of the ethical turn in aesthetic reflection [and] is also a cate-
gory that produces an indistinction between right and fact, occupying the same place in aesthetic 
reflection that terror does on the political plane. The idea of the unrepresentable in fact conflates 
two distinct notions: impossibility and interdiction” (p. 124).
 In The Emancipated Spectator, Rancière (2009) makes a significant point that, although 
outside of the scope of this argument, deserves further consideration: viewing images of this kind 
makes the spectator guilty (p. 88).He goes on to argue that an image is much more than a duplicate 
of reality, and unearths a disturbing aspect of witnessing: “The true witness is one who does not 
want to witness. . . .The force of the silence that translates the unrepresntability of the event exists 
only through its representation” (pp. 91-92).
 The stages of grief to which I refer here were popularized by Elizabeth Kübler-Ross who, 
in her 1969 On Death and Dying, characterized grief as moving in a linear fashion through, respec-
tively, denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. My argument here, following Derrida 
and Butler, is that this is impossible in a situation that invokes constant, never-ending grief. 
 15 Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s 2008 “Anatomy of 9/11: Evil, Rationalism, and the Sacred” focuses largely 
on the linguistic problems with terms like “9/11” and “Ground Zero” but also represents the body 
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of academic work on 9/11--despite its formal tone and compelling analysis, Dupuy’s article also in-
cludes a lengthy first-person narrative about his own experiences during the aftermath of the event.
 16 Deems D. Morrione (2006) explores writing itself as a kind of violence against an event (after 
Derrida).  In addition, Morrione makes an interesting connection to the idea of the other as I have 
presented it here, writing that “what was actually destroyed on September 11, 2001 [was] the ability 
of America to serve as the symbolic center of global politics for itself and the other” (p. 159, origi-
nal emphasis).  The loss of this symbolic center may partially explain the American need to replace 
the photographs with hero-narratives and images; this connects to the ideas put forth by Judith 
Butler (2000, 2010) in Antigone’s Claim and in Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?.
